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Abstract
Reviews briefly the origins of the blocked assets-claims problem and discusses the authority
for the original blocking controls and later claims adjudication. Also examines in detail the operative provisions of the claims-assets agreement as an intergovernmental accord embodying the final
settlement of the United States claims and affecting the overall context of Sino-American political
and economical relations.

COMMENT
THE BLOCKED CHINESE ASSETSUNITED STATES CLAIMS PROBLEM:
THE LUMP-SUM SETTLEMENT SOLUTION
INTRODUCTION
'We want to do business.' Quite right, business will be
done."' This statement by Chairman Mao Tse-tung in 1949 expresses what the People's Republic of China (PRC) has consistently
maintained to be its open policy concerning trade: namely, "that it
is ready, willing, and able to trade with other countries on the basis of equality and mutual benefit." 2 Until very recently, however,
such a free flow of trade between China and the United States had
been severely impeded by the unresolved Sino-American assetsclaim issue-$80.5 million in Chinese assets blocked in the United
States3 and $196.9 million in private United States claims against
the PRC 4-which arose out of retaliatory actions by both countries
during the Korean War. 5 This issue has been resolved by conclusion of the United States-People's Republic of China Claims-Assets
Agreement on May 11, 1979.6
The first part of this Comment reviews briefly the origins of
the blocked assets-claims problem and discusses the authority for
the original blocking controls and later claims adjudication. The second part examines in detail the operative provisions of the claims1. Mao Tse-tung, On the People's Democratic Dictatorship, in 4 SELECTED
WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG 416 (1961), as quoted in Wang, Foreign Trade Policy and
Apparatus of the People's Republic of China, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 182, at
183 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Wang].
2. Wang, supra note 1, at 183.
3. See note 56 infra and accompanying text.
4. See note 48 infra.
5. See notes 11-15 infra and accompanying text.
6. Agreement. Concerning the Settlement of Claims, May 11, 1979, United
States-People's Republic of China, _ U.S.T. _ T.I.A.S. No. 9306. It appears that the
Chinese have never signed an intergovernmental claims agreement before. See generally D. JOHNSON & H. CHIU, AGREEMENTS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
1949-1967 (1968). They have, however, settled particular claims on an individual basis. See, e.g., 13 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 870 (1974) as cited in Note, Blocked Chinese Assets: Present Status and Future Disposition, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 959, 1002
n.243 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Present Status].
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assets agreement and evaluates the agreement as an intergov-

ernmental accord embodying the final settlement of United States
claims and affecting the overall context of Sino-American political
and economic relations.
I.

BACKGROUND OF THE BLOCKED CHINESE ASSETSUNITED STATES CLAIMS ISSUE

A.

Historical Review

Civil war broke out in China between the Nationalists and the
Communists in the late 1920's. 7 In 1928, the United States recognized the Nationalist Government of the Republic of China as the
sole legal government of China.8 After World War II, however, the
Communists gained control of the whole of the Chinese mainland, 9
and the People's Republic of China was proclaimed on October 1,
1949.10

On December 14, 1950, China intervened in the Korean
War"-thereby becoming a direct enemy of the United States. In
immediate response, President Truman declared the Korean Emergency,' 2 and the Secretary of the Treasury issued control regula7. In 1922, the Chinese Nationalists and the Chinese Communists joined forces
under the leadership of Nationalist Sun Yat-sen in order to unite the nation, combat
the warlords, and deal with oppressive foreign treaties. The two forces were never
fully able to reconcile their political and economic goals, however, and after Sun's
death on March 12, 1925, the alliance began to disintegrate. In April, 1927 Chiang
Kai-shek, then the principal military commander, staged a coup d'etat against part of
the Communist leadership and set up his capital in Nanking. The new Nanking government expelled the Chinese Communists from its ranks and began a nationwide
campaign of terror to suppress the Communist revolution. Thus, by December, 1927
the latent split between the right and left wings of the revolution had become open
civil war. See generally 2 J. FAIRBANK, E. REISCHAUER & A. CRAIs, A HISTORY OF
EAST ASIAN CIVILIZATION, 678-88 (1965).

8. Note, The United States and the People's Republic of China: The Blocked
Assets-Claims Problem, 8 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 253, 254 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Blocked Assets].
9. Far Eastern Economic Review, Asia 1979 Yearbook, at 169, col. 2.
10. Id.
11. Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Treasury Dep't, 1970 Census of
Blocked Chinese Assets in the United States 1 (unpublished, available from Office of
Foreign Assets Control) [hereinafter cited as OFAC Census].
12. Pres. Proc. No. 2914, 3 C.F.R. 99 (1949-1953 Compilation), reprinted in 50
U.S.C. app. notes prec. § 1 (1976). Citing the "recent events in Korea and elsewhere," President Truman declared that "world conquest by communist imperialism
is the goal of the forces of aggression that have been loosed upon the world," and
proclaimed "the existence of a national emergency, which requires that the military,
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tions to block all assets and accounts in the United States in which
the PRC or its nationals had any direct or indirect interest. 1 3 At
the same time, the Treasury proclaimed a complete embargo on
commercial and financial transactions with the PRC.' 4 On December 28, 1950, the PRC ordered expropriation of all property within
its jurisdiction belonging to United States nationals. 15 The United
States responded by reaffirming its recognition of the Nationalist
Government and embarking on a policy of non-recognition of the
PRC. 16
For two decades after the Communist takeover, United States
non-recognition of the PRC and the unresolved blocked assetsclaims issue kept Sino-American trade and communication to a
minimum. Since the early 1970's, however, the United States has
made repeated attempts to lift the Bamboo Curtain. 1 7 In conjunction with these efforts at detente, has been the United States firm
position on the blocked assets-claims issue: namely, that no provision for release of the blocked Chinese assets would be made withnaval, air, and civilian defenses of this country be strengthened as speedily as possible to the end that we may be able to repeal any and all threats against our national
security." Id.
13. 31 C.F.R. pt. 500 (1978). It should be noted, however, that the regulations
which blocked the assets did not affect ownership. The blocking was in no way a
confiscation. The regulations prevented removal of the assets but permitted certain
other specified forms of transfer: for example, at all times the owner could invest his
assets in listed securities or transfer his funds from demand accounts to interest bearing accounts. Telephone conversation with Dennis O'Connell, Acting Chief
Counsel-Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Treasury Dep't (April 10, 1979).
14. The regulations promulgated by the Treasury constituted a complete embargo on commercial and financial transactions with the PRC and all nationals
thereof wherever located. Simultaneously, the Commerce Department embargoed all
exports from the United States to the PRC under the authority of the Export Control
Act. OFAC Census, supra note 11, at 1.
15. The phrase used by the PRC to describe the action was "control and inventory." Government Administrative Council Issues Orderfor the Control of American
Government and Private Property in China (Dec. 28, 1950) reprinted in J. COHEN &
H. CHIU, PEOPLE'S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 686-87 (1974). [hereinafter
cited as J. COHEN & H. CHIU].
16. Blocked Assets, supra note 8, at 256.
17. By 1969, most restrictions on United States citizens' travel to China had
been removed. 34 Fed. Reg. 20191 (1969) (adding 31 C.F.R. § 500.544-545). By 1971,
controls on imports and exports had been eased. 36 Fed. Reg. 8584, 11441 (1971)
(adding 31 C.F.R. § 500.546-547); 16 DEP'T COM. EXPORT CONTROL BULL. pt. 2
(1970). In February, 1972 President Nixon visited China and signed the Shanghai
Communique. 66 DEP'T STATE BULL. 435 (1972). In 1973, the National Council for
United States-China Trade was established. China Trader, Spring 1979, at 30. In
1975, President Ford visited Peking. Id.
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out simultaneous arrangement for settlement of private American
claims against China.' 8 The basic question concerning the blocked
assets themselves has been whether they should be incorporated as
part of the funding of the settlement, or whether satisfaction of the
claims should come solely from a separate lump-sum payment by
China which would then allow the assets to be unblocked.19
B.

Authority for the Blocking Controls

President Truman's declaration of the Korean Emergency was
the basis on which the Treasury Department promulgated the regulations that effectively blocked the Chinese assets. 20 The source of
executive power under which the assets were blocked is Section
5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA).2 1 As enacted in
1917, the purpose of the Act was to give the President full power
to conduct economic warfare by authorizing him to prohibit certain
financial transactions which might be advantageous to an enemy
22
during wartime.
In 1933 the TWEA was amended, to authorize the President
to designate an agency which would effect regulations implementing his powers under Section 5(b) of the Act, and to allow him
to exercise those powers during a proclaimed national emergency
as well as during wartime. 2 3 The Secretary of the Treasury has
18. Lubman, Trade Between the United States and the People's Republic of
China: Practice, Policy, and Law, 8 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1, 56 n.135 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Lubman].
19. Present Status, supra note 6, at 998-99.
20. See notes 13, 14 supra.
21. Act of Oct. 6, 1917, ch. 106, § 5(b), 40 Stat. 415 (1917), as amended, 50
U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (1976).
22. Present Status, supra note 6, at 967; Blocked Assets, supra note 8, at 255
n.20.
23. Act of Mar. 9, 1933, ch. 1, § 2, 48 Stat. 1, 12 U.S.C. § 95a (1976). Section
5(b) authorized the:
President or his delegate, during time of war or national emergency, to investigate, regulate, or prohibit all commercial and financial transactions by
Americans with foreign countries or the nationals of such countries or with
respect to any property subject to the jurisdiction of the United States in
which such countries or their nationals have any interest of any nature whatsoever.
Sommerfield, Treasury Regulations Affecting Trade with the Sino-Soviet Bloc and
Cuba, 19 Bus. LAW. 861, 861 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Sommerfield].
On December 28, 1977 Congress amended the TWEA to remove the national
emergency powers of the President under Section 5(b). Pub. L. No. 95-223, Title I, §
101(a), 91 Stat. 1625 (1977). In another amendment, known as the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act, the President was granted substantially the same
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been consistently designated as the agency for the issuance of regulations implementing the President's Section 5(b) powers, 2 4 and it
is under this delegated authority that the Secretary in 1950 pro25
mulgated the Foreign Assets Control Regulations (Regulations).
The power of the Secretary of the Treasury to promulgate the Regulations has been further delegated to and is currently adminis26
tered by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).
The blocking regulations were issued "as an incident of" the
declaration of the Korean Emergency, 2 7 and their extension was
conditioned upon its continued existence. 2 8 The rationale for the
blocking centered initially upon the use the Chinese could make of
the assets in the Korean conflict.2 9 In the pivotal case of Sardino
v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 30 however, the Second Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals held that although the
Korean Emergency was established within the context of the Korean War, the Regulations actually were intended to encompass
and authorize measures against the expansion of world communism
in general.31 The Sardino prohibition against aid to communism in
general has remained in effect for the duration of the Cold War
32
and has justified the blocking of the Chinese assets to date.
authorities to investigate, regulate, or prohibit transactions by Americans. Such authorities are to be exercised only:
to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole
or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a national emergency with respect to such threat. Any exercise of such authorities to deal with
any new threat shall be based on a new declaration of national emergency which
must be with respect to such threat.
Id. Title II, § 202(a)(b), 91 Stat. 1626 (1977).
24. Present Status, supra note 6, at 969.
25. Id.
26. Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Treasury Dep't, Foreign Assets Control Regulations and Related Documents 1, 22 (Dec. 17, 1950, revised May, 1976)
(available from Office of Foreign Assets Control).
27. Present Status, supra note 6, at 970.
28. Id. at 971.
29. 23 DEP'T STATE BULL. 1004 (1950).
30. 361 F.2d 106 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 898 (1966).
31. Id. at 109-10. Judge Friendly stated:
Hard currency is a weapon in the struggle between the free and the communist worlds; it would be a strange reading of the Constitution to regard it as
demanding depletion of dollar resources for the benefit of a government
seeking to create a base for activities inimical to our national welfare.
Id. at 112.
32. See id. at 109.
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Section 500.201 of the Regulations is the primary blocking
provision applied to the Chinese assets. 33 The Section operates to
invalidate any withdrawal of assets after December 17, 1950 from
accounts held by Chinese nationals, even if the transaction is completed outside the United States. 34 The Section applies to all per35
sons or property subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
While the Regulations remain in force today, their underlying
purpose has changed substantially. 36 Until 1971, as the mainstay of
the trade embargo, the Regulations were intended primarily to
prevent Chinese acquisition of foreign exchange through transactions with Americans. 37 Since 1971, when the embargo was lifted,
the role of the Regulations has been more that of a caretaker: that
is, to administer the full range of blocking controls imposed on Chinese assets which became subject to regulation before May 7,
1971, and to effectively preserve the assets for eventual use in a
settlement of United States claims against China. 3 8 Chinese funds
which became subject to United States jurisdiction after May 7,
1971 have not been blocked 39 but have been subject to attachment
to satisfy outstanding United States claims.
C.

Authority for Claims Adjudication
and Blocked Assets Census

On November 6, 1966, in anticipation of a developing SinoAmerican relationship, 40 Congress amended Title V of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949 (ICSA),4 ' authorizing the
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (FCSC)4 2 to receive and
determine the validity and amount of claims of United States nationals resulting from expropriation or other takings of property by
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
U.S.C. §
42.
1954, 68

Present Status, supra note 6, at 973.
31 C.F.R. § 500.201(b)(2) (1978).
Id. § 500.201(b)(1)-(2) (1978).
Present Status, supra note 6, at 960-64.
Id. at 961.
Id. at 964.
31 C.F.R. § 500.546(b)(1) (1978).
Blocked Assets, supra note 8, at 265 n.64.
Act of Nov. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-780, § 1, 80 Stat. 1365 (amending 22
1643 (1950)).
The FCSC was created by the President's Reorganization Plan No. 1 of
Stat. 1279 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 1622 (1958)), which abolished the War

Claims and International Claims Commissions and transferred their functions to the

FCSC.
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the PRC between October 1, 1949 and the date of the amendment. 4 3 The purpose of the China Claims Program was "to obtain
information concerning the total amount of claims against the People's Republic of China." 44 Title V did not provide for the payment
of such claims; 45 rather, it provided for a pre-settlement adjudication which might assist the United States Government in future
claims settlement negotiations. 4 6 The FCSC began its review of
United States claims in 1968, 4 and by 1972 had certified to the
Secretary of State 378 claims resulting in total losses of approxi48
mately $196.9 million.
43. Any claims that may have arisen between November 6, 1966 and May 11,
1979 remain to be adjudicated. On June 1, 1979, under authority granted in Title I of
the International Claims Settlement Act (ICSA), as amended, the FCSC commenced
the administration of a brief new China Claims Program, in which the FCSC will
consider only those claims of United States nationals for losses in China which
arose between November 6, 1966 and May 11, 1979, the date of the claims settlement agreement. The deadline for filing such claims was August 31, 1979. FCSC,
Summary of the China Claims Program 2 (June 4, 1979) (available from the FCSC,
1111 20th St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20579) [hereinafter cited as FCSC Summary].
The FCSC has as yet made no announcement of the number of new claims
which have been favorably decided. It is anticipated, however, that some losses will
be certified under the new program. The amount of these losses would be added to
the $196,861,841 in previously certified losses, see note 48 infra, thereby diminishing the pro rata share ultimately distributed to claimants whose claims exceed
$1,000. This reduction would be in addition to the 5% deduction provided as reimbursement of United States Government expenses in administering both China
Claims Programs. See note 83 infra. The amount by which American claimants' recovery will be decreased due to these factors is presently unknown. However, statements throughout this Comment discussing the amount of pro rata recovery, expressed either in per cent of certified losses or number of cents on the dollar, should
be read with both factors in mind.
44. 22 U.S.C. § 1643 (1976).
45. The adjudication and certification of a claim by the FCSC under the ICSA
does not constitute a judgment upon which execution may be obtained in a United
States court. Action by the FCSC is, however, "final and conclusive on all questions
of law and fact and not subject to review by the Secretary of State or any other official department, agency, or establishment of the United States or by any court by
mandamus or otherwise." 22 U.S.C. § 1623(h) (1976).
46. FCSC Summary, supra note 43, at 1.
47. Solomon, When 410 on the dollar is a good deal, Christian Sci. Monitor,
Mar. 28, 1979, at 23, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Solomon] (Anthony M. Solomon is
Undersecretary for Monetary Affairs-U.S. Treasury Dep't).
48. The FCSC adjudicated a total of 576 claims, rendering favorable decisions
in 378 claims resulting in certified losses in the total principal amount of
$196,861,841. FCSC Summary, supra note 43, at 3. Of this amount, claims of individuals totalled approximately $14.5 million; claims of religious and other non-profit organizations, $58.3 million; and claims of corporate and other business entities, $124.1
million. Id. The five largest claims were asserted by Shanghai Power Company for
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The device of pre-adjudication has been acclaimed as a means
of achieving fairly prompt hearings while evidence and testimony
are still fresh. 49 It is possible, however, that the figure of $196.9
million may not accurately reflect the true value of the total claims
due to problems in the claims valuation process. 50 Chief among the
problems encountered were the fluctuating exchange rates of both
51
currencies and the extensive destruction of financial records.
Nevertheless, $196.9 million is the total claims figure used consist52
ently in all authoritative statements.
Immediately after the issuance of the Foreign Assets Control
Regulations, the United States Treasury undertook a census of
blocked Chinese property in the United States. 53 The purpose of
the census was to determine the nature, extent, and location of assets subject to the Regulations and to assist in the formulation of
licensing and other policies relating to the assets. 54 In June, 1970,
the Treasury undertook a second census of the blocked assets to
provide more current information for use in eventual claims-assets
settlement negotiations. 55 The total present value of the blocked
56
assets is estimated to be approximately $80.5 million.
$53,832,885, Esso Standard for $27,026,602, the United Board of Christian Higher
Education for $23,245,557, Caltex Limited for $15,443,770, and IT&T Corporation for
$7,765,315. Id. When the FCSC adjudicated the United States claims, it imposed interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of loss to the date of claims settlement. To a great extent, however, the payment of interest on these claims is an academic question. Under the FCSC pay-out formula, see note 83 infra, every claimant
must be fully compensated for the total amount of principal of his claim before interest can be paid on any claim. Since the settlement fund of $80.5 million, see note 78
infra, is insufficient to fully compensate each claimant even for his lost principal, it
is highly unlikely that any claimant will be awarded interest.
49. H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 436 (2d ed.
1976) [hereinafter cited as H. STEINER & D. VAGTS].
50. Blocked Assets, supra note 8, at 271 n.93.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. OFAC Census, supra note 11, at 1.
54. id.
55. A total of $76.5 million in blocked assets was reported under the 1970 census. Id. at 1-2.
56. Dep't of the Treasury News 3 (May 14, 1979). The change in amount is due
to appreciations in property values and authorized changes in the forms of property.
OFAC Census, supra note 11, at 1-2. Of the $80.5 million, 70%, or $53.2 million,
consists of deposits held by banks in the United States; 20%, or $15.6 million
consists of securities held by banks and brokerage firms; $10.6 million of this total is
held for individuals in China. Id. at 2-3. At the time the assets were blocked, no provision was made for the assessment of any interest such as was imposed on the certi-
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D.

The PreliminaryAgreement in Principle

Negotiations that led to the conclusion of the United StatesPeople's Republic of China Claims-Assets Agreement of May 11,
1979 were conducted within the framework of the preliminary
"agreement in principle" 57 negotiated in February, 1973.58 The basis of the 1973 agreement was the concept of an assignment under
which the PRC would have assigned to the United States its right,
title, and interest in the blocked assets in full settlement of private
American claims against the PRC for expropriated property.5 9 The
blocked assets then would have been unblocked, vested, liquidat60
ed, and distributed in accordance with Congressional mandate.
Central to the feasibility of the 1973 approach was the assumption that once the assets were unblocked, the entire $80.5 million
would be available to compensate American claims. 6 1 United States
62
officials soon realized, however, that this would not be the case.
The amount the United States could expect to recover would depend on the strength of the Chinese title and that title was
disputed, at least with respect to some of the assets. 63 The OFAC
reported, as of 1970, a total of $11.6 million in adverse claims
against the blocked assets, 64 the major adverse claimant being the
Government of the Republic of China (Taiwan). 65 Although only
$9.6 million in adverse claims were registered by Taiwanese interfled United States claims. On March 2, 1979, however, the Treasury promulgated 31
C.F.R. § 500.205, requiring that all bank deposits and certain other funds blocked
under § 500.201 be placed in interest-bearing accounts by April 2, 1979. 44 Fed.
Reg. 11764 (1979).
57. 68 DEP'T STATE BULL. 313, 344 (1973).
58. The "agreement in principle" was announced by U.S. Secretary of State
William Rogers and PRC Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei on March 2, 1973. The
agreement, however, was never formally concluded. Comment, Expropriated Property, Frozen Assets, and Sovereign Immunity: Legal Obstacles to United StatesChina Trade Regulations, 15 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 254, 257 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as ExpropriatedProperty].
59. Solomon, supra note 47, at 23, col. 2.
60. Business America, July 16, 1979, at 7, col. 1-2.
61. N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1979, § A, at 5, col. 1.
62. Id.
63. Solomon, supra note 47, at 23, col. 2.
64. OFAC Census, supra note 11, at 6. "Adverse claim" is defined as "any
claim asserted or existing against or with respect to, any item of property being reported which was adverse to the interests of the national whose property was being
reported." The term includes "offsets, liens, and any legal action or proceedings
with respect to any items of property reported." Id. at 11-12.
65. Id. at 6.
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ests in 1973,66 it was possible that Taiwanese banks and emigrant
corporations would each lay claim to the previously blocked assets
67
of the whole of China, amounting to some $57.1 million.
The OFAC made no attempt to verify any of these conflicting
claims. 68 Instead, the question of who would be entitled to the
assets after unblocking was left ultimately to be decided in the
United States courts. 69 Treasury officials calculated, however, that
after all adverse claims were fully litigated, no more than $30-40
million would be available to compensate American claimants and
then only after years of litigation. 70 This recovery would have provided a pro rata return of approximately 15-20 cents on the dollar
which fell below what Government officials considered an accept72
able minimum. 71 Accordingly, the United States negotiating team
abandoned the assignment approach and the agreement in princi73
ple was never concluded.
II.

THE UNITED STATES-PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
CLAIMS-ASSETS AGREEMENT OF MAY 11, 1979
A.

The Operative Provisions

Relations between the United States and China continued to
improve from the time of the preliminary agreement in principle
and culminated in President Carter's announcement on December
15, 1978 of his intention to establish full diplomatic relations with
China. 74 On January 1, 1979 the United States recognized the Peo75
ple's Republic of China as the "sole legal government of China,"

66. The claims asserted by Taiwan are against funds "held primarily in the
name of a bank in New York for its branches under [PRC] control." Id.
67. Present Status, supra note 6, at 1000.
68. OFAC Census, supra note 11, at 6.
69. Dep't of the Treasury News 3 (May 14, 1979).
70. See Solomon, supra note 47, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1979, § A, at 5, col.
1; Wall St. J., Mar. 5, 1979, at 8, col. 2.
71. See note 125 infra.
72. During Treasury Secretary Blumenthal's mission to China (Feb. 24,
1979-Mar. 4, 1979), claims negotiations on behalf of the United States were conducted by a joint Treasury-State Department team. Telephone conversation with
Steve A. Orlins, Attorney Advisor-U.S. State Dep't (July 20, 1979).
73. ExpropriatedProperty, supra note 58, at 257-58.
74. 14 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 2264 (Dec. 18, 1978).

75. Id.
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and negotiations for a settlement of the claims-assets issue commenced shortly thereafter. 76 The United States-People's Republic
of China Claims-Assets Agreement (Agreement) was initialled on
March 2, 1979, 77 and became effective upon signature on May 11,
1979.78
Under the terms of the Agreement, the PRC will pay the
lump sum of $80.5 million in "full and final settlement" 79 of private
United States claims against the PRC arising from any "nationalization, expropriation, intervention, and other taking of, or special
measures directed against property" of United States nationals between October 1, 1949, and May 11, 1979.80 Of the $80.5 million,
the PRC made the first payment of $30 million on October 1,
1979.81 It will pay the balance in five annual installments of $10.1
million each, starting October 1, 1980.82
The Agreement provides for the compensation over six years
of 40.9% of the value of certified United States claims, providing a
76. Over 30 years elapsed between the Chinese expropriation of American
property and the conclusion of the United States-People's Republic of China agreement. This entire period, however, was one of minimal Sino-American governmental
communication. Therefore, little possibility of negotiation of a claims settlement existed. N.Y. Times, May 15, 1979, § D, at 1, col. 1. Within five months of United
States diplomatic recognition of the PRC, however, the United States-People's Republic of China Claims-Asset Agreement was signed, see notes 74 supra and 78
infra.
77. The agreement was initialled in Beijing by U.S. Treasury Secretary W
Michael Blumenthal and PRC Finance Minister Zhang Jingfu. U.S. Dep't of Commerce News 1 (May 11, 1979). The day before, the United States officially upgraded
its liaison office in Beijing to full embassy status and officially closed its embassy in
Taipei, Taiwan. 39 Facts on File 146, col. 3 (Mar. 2, 1979).
78. - U.S.T. - T.I.A.S. No. 9306, supra note 6, art. VI. The agreement was
signed in Beijing by U.S. Commerce Secretary Juanita M. Kreps and PRC Finance
Minister Zhang Jingfu. It is an executive agreement, requiring no Congressional approval. Dep't of the Treasury News 3 (May 14, 1979).
79. Id. art Ill(a).
80. Id. art. I(a). The agreement does not cover claims of the United States Government against the PRC. These claims, namely U.S. Export-Import Bank claims,
came to approximately $50 million-principal and interest-loaned to the Republic
of China before 1949. N.Y. Times, July 8, 1979, § A, at 11, col. 2.
81. Telephone conversation with Russell Munk, Assistant General Counsel for
International Affairs-U.S. Treasury Dep't (Oct. 30, 1979).
82.
- U.S.T. - T.I.A.S. No. 9306, supra note 6, art. II. These monies will be
placed in a China Claims Fund out of which payments will be made in accordance with Title I of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949 on losses certified by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission. FCSC Summary, supra note 43,
at 2.
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pro rata return of approximately 41 cents on the dollar to American
83
claimants.
The United States will unblock by January 31, 1980 all assets
which were blocked on or after December 17, 1950 because of "an
interest, direct or indirect, in those assets of the PRC, its nationals, or natural and juridical persons subject to its jurisdiction and
"4
control ....
The Agreement is silent on the complex question of actual
ownership of the blocked assets, nor has the PRC indicated which
of the assets it regards as belonging to it. 8 5 In a "spirit of mutual
cooperation," however, the United States has agreed that prior to
unblocking, it will notify all asset-holders who are PRC nationals
that the PRC requests that they refrain from transferring or with86
drawing the assets without its consent.
B.

An Evaluation of the Settlement

The United States-People's Republic of China Claims-Assets
Agreement can perhaps best be evaluated against a background of
previous lump-sum agreements covering claims arising out of similar expropriations by other communist countries. Between 1917 and
1949 the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and
8 7
Hungary expropriated large amounts of foreign-owned property.

83. Solomon, supra note 47, at 23, col. 2. 22 U.S.C. § 1627(e) (1976) provides
that each claimant will receive 100% of the first $1,000 of his claim and a pro rata
share (here approximately 40.9%) of the remainder. In order to recover United
States Government administrative expenses, however, § 1626(b) provides that 5%
will be deducted from each payment as it is received by the Treasury, before any
distribution is made to American claimants. Therefore, each claimant will receive
somewhat less than 40.9% of the balance of his claim.
84. - U.S.T. - T.I.A.S. No. 9306, supra note 6, art. II(b). The United States
and the PRC have agreed to postpone the unblocking of Chinese assets originally
scheduled for October 1, 1979. 44 Fed. Reg. 56434 (1979).
85. Dep't of the Treasury News 3 (May 14, 1979).
86. - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. 9306, supra note 6, art. 11(b). The PRC has decreed that, upon unblocking, all assets are to be recovered or withdrawn exclusively
through the Bank of China. After recovery or withdrawal, 10% of the private assets
will be returned in foreign currency. The balance will be paid in Renminbi, the Chinese currency. Beijing NCNA Int'l Service in English, 0123 GMT Sept. 9, 1979, in
FBIS-CHI, Sept. 10, 1979, at B1-2. The Renminbi will be treated as foreign remittances, meaning the Chinese will be able to use it in special stores to purchase items
not generally obtainable on the open market. Wall St. J., Sept. 28, 1979, at 24, col. 3.
87. These extensive expropriations included "branches of industry, transportation and communication facilities, commercial enterprises, banks and insurance
companies, as well as other properties." Dawson & Weston, "Prompt, Adequate and
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The global claims settlement agreements8 8 negotiated by the United
States Government to cover claims arising out of expropriation of
privately-owned American property in each of these countries are
briefly summarized below.
1. Soviet Union-In November, 1933 the United States and
the Soviet Union agreed to settle certain expropriation claims by
the assignment8 9 to the United States of assets due the Soviet Government as the successor of prior governments of Russia. Only
9.7% of American claims were compensated under this agreement
and then only after twenty years of litigation. 90
2. Yugoslavia-The United States and Yugoslavia concluded
two lump-sum agreements to settle claims arising out of Yugoslavian nationalizations of American-owned property. By an agreement
of 1948,91 Yugoslavia agreed to create a fund of $17 million to resolve claims for nationalizations to that date. That settlement
yielded a compensation rate of 91%,92 but at the same time the
United States agreed to release $40 million in blocked gold bullion
93
in return for the $17 million cash payment.
Claims based upon later Yugoslavian nationalizations were settled by a 1964 agreement 94 which called for the payment by
Yugoslavia over five years of a total of $3.5 million, resulting in the
compensation of 36.1% of American claims. 95
Effective": A Universal Standard of Compensation?, 30 FORDHAM L. REV. 727, 742
(1962) [hereinafter cited as Dawson & Weston].
88. A "global", "lump-sum", or "en bloc" settlement involves:
an agreement, arrived at by diplomatic negotiation between governments, to
settle outstanding international claims by the payment of a given sum without resorting to international adjudication. Such a settlement permits the
state receiving the lump sum to distribute the fund thus acquired among
claimants who may be entitled thereto pursuant to domestic procedure ....
[T]he sum agreed upon may be paid over a given number of years.
Re, Domestic Adjudication and Lump-Sum Settlement as an Enforcement Technique, 58 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROCEEDINGS 39, 40 (1964) quoted in R. LILLICH & B.
WESTON,

INTERNATIONAL

CLAIMS:

THEIR SETTLEMENT BY

LUMP

SUM AGREE-

MENTS, pt. 2, at Author's Introduction (1975) [hereinafter cited as R. LILLICH & B.
WESTON].

89. Litvinov Assignment, Nov. 16, 1933, 2 FOREIGN REL.
90. 1977 FCSC Ann. Rep. 62.
91. Agreement Regarding Pecuniary Claims, July 19,
Yugoslavia, 62 Stat. 2658, T.I.A.S. No. 1803, 89 U.N.T.S. 43.
92. 1977 FCSC Ann. Rep. 63.
93. Solomon, supra note 47, at 23, col. 3.
94. Agreement on Claims of United States Nationals,
States-Yugoslavia, 16 U.S.T. 1,T.I.A.S. No. 5750, 550 U.N.T.S.
95. 1977 FCSC Ann. Rep. 63.

U.S. 813 (1933).
1948, United States-

Nov. 5, 1964, United
31.
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3. Bulgaria-A 1963 agreement 96 provided for a settlement of
$35 million, of which $400,000 was to be paid by Bulgaria over a
two-year period, and the remainder was taken from Bulgarian assets in this country that had been vested. The United StatesBulgarian settlement provided a return of 69.7% on American
97
claims.
4. Rumania-By an agreement of 196098 Rumania undertook
to pay $25 million over six years in addition to a $22 million fund
established by the United States in 1954 out of blocked Rumanian
assets which the United States Government had vested and liquidated. The United States-Rumanian settlement recovered 37.8% of
the value of United States claims. 99
5. Hungary-A 1973 agreement' 0 0 provided for a settlement
to be funded by $3,320,000 from vested Hungarian assets plus
$18,900,000 to be paid by Hungary over a twenty-year period,
producing a return of 40% on American claims. 10' The Hungarian
agreement is similar to the United States-People's Republic of
China agreement not only in the rate of compensation but also in
the fact that twenty-eight years elapsed from the time of claims ac02
crual to eventual settlement.'
6. Poland-A 1960 agreement 10 3 provided that Poland would
pay the United States $40 million over twenty years, and the
United States Government would release its blocking controls over
all Polish property in the United States. Approximately 33% of certified United States losses were compensated under this agree0 4
ment.'
The United States-People's Republic of China Claims-Assets
Agreement embodies the final settlement of United States claims
arising out of PRC expropriation of private American property and
96. Agreement on Claims of United States Nationals, July 2, 1963,
States-Bulgaria, 14 U.S.T. 969, T.I.A.S. No. 5387, 479 U.N.T.S. 245.
97. 1977 FCSC Ann. Rep. 61.
98. Agreement on Claims of United States Nationals, Mar. 30, 1960,
States-Rumania, 11 U.S.T. 317, T.I.A.S. No. 4451, 371 U.N.T.S. 163.
99. 1977 FCSC Ann. Rep. 62.
100. Agreement Regarding Settlement of Claims, Mar. 6, 1973, United
Hungary, 24 U.S.T. 522, T.I.A.S. No. 7569.
101. 1977 FCSC Ann. Rep. 62.
102. R. LILLICH & B. WESTON, supra note 88, pt. 1, at 214.
103. Agreement on Claims of United States Nationals, July 16, 1960,
States-Poland, 11 U.S.T. 1953, T.I.A.S. No. 4545, 384 U.N.T.S. 169.
104. 1977 FCSC Ann. Rep. 61.

United

United

States-

United
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should be evaluated as such. Any appraisal of the settlement is
complicated, however, by a lack of fundamental agreement as to
the principles to be applied in the highly controversial area of the
law of international claims. 1 05 There is far from universal consensus
with respect to a minimum international standard governing the
time, amount, and manner of compensation in cases of expropriation of alien-owned property. 10 6 To clearly delineate the areas of
agreement and disagreement, an important historical distinction
should be drawn at the outset. Prior to World War I, most state
deprivations of foreign-owned wealth consisted of isolated takings
of individual and personal property, 10 7 and the resulting claims
were settled by mixed tribunals on a case by case basis.' 08 The
standard of compensation formulated during this period of limited
deprivations reflected the economic and political development of
Western Europe and the United States. 10 9 That standard, known
as the orthodox compensation rule, 10 called for the payment of
"prompt, adequate, and effective" compensation."' Historically,
the United States has adhered to the orthodox view 1 2 and contin105. Domke, Foreword to R. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR ADJUDICATION BY NATIONAL COMMISSIONS at viii (1962) [hereinafter cited as Domke].
106. H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, supra note 49, at 381.
107. Dawson & Weston, supra note 87, at 729. Examples of such takings include: a. the appropriation of a parcel of land from a British subject for the royal gardens of the King of Greece. Finlay Case, 39 BIT. FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 410
(1849), cited in Dawson & Weston, supra note 87, at 729 n.ll; b. the seizure of insubstantial foreign railway properties in Portugese East Africa. Case of the Delogoa
Bay Ry. (1891), 2 MOORE, ARBITRATIONS 1865 (1898), cited in Dawson & Weston,
supra note 87, at 729 n.12; c. the taking of the property of several "dissolved" foreign "religious communities." Expropriated Religious Properties Case (1910), 1 U.N.
REP. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 7 (1920), cited in Dawson & Weston, supra note 87, at 729
n.12.
108. Domke, supra note 105, at viii.
109. Dawson & Weston, supra note 87, at 729.
110. Id. at 734.
111. The Restatement (Second) of U.S. Foreign Relations Law requires that
"just compensation" must be "adequate in amount," "paid with reasonable promptness," and "paid in a form that is effectively realizable by the alien .... RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §

192 (1962).

The Restatement (Second) specifies that "[u]nder ordinary conditions . . . the
amount must be equivalent to the full value of the property taken, together with interest to the date of payment." Id. at § 193(1) (emphasis added). Promptness requires
"payment as soon as is reasonable under the circumstances .... ." Id. at §
194.
Effectiveness calls for payment "in the form of cash or property readily convertible
into cash." Id. at § 195(1).
112. H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, supra note 49, at 431. The most celebrated expression of American preference for the orthodox or traditional compensation rule
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13
ues to do so in its official statements to the present date.1
The orthodox standard enjoyed a high degree of acceptance
among the Western developed nations up to the time of the first
World War. 1 14 The outbreak of World War I, however, marked
the beginning of an era of increasing cases of "nationalization"--extensive expropriations of alien-owned property, frequently
executed as part of a broad program of social and economic reform. 1 1 5 Claims arising from expropriations of this general and impersonal character have been settled mostly by lump-sum agreements which involve the adjustment of a dispute between two
states, and which provide for "negotiated" compensation as indemnification for all the property expropriated, regardless of the value
of individual claims." 6 No international tribunal has passed upon
the question of compensation in expropriations of the "nationalization" type. 117
Due probably to the complexity of the situations involved,
however, three distinct theories of compensation have devel8
oped. 11
First, the traditional or "orthodox" theory, discussed previously, requires "prompt, adequate, and effective" compensation in
both types of expropriation of alien-owned property, 119 and places

can be traced back to a 1930 statement by Secretary of State Cordell Hull. Secretary
Hull contended that: "under every rule of law and equity no government is entitled
to expropriate property, for whatever purpose, without provision for prompt, adequate, and effective payment thereof." Note of Secretary of State Hull of Aug. 22,
1938, Press Releases, U.S. Dep't of State, Vol. 19, No. 465, at 138, 5 FOREIGN REL.
U.S. 647, 677 (1938).
113. In a more recent example of United States Government commitment to
this principle, Secretary of State Kissinger stated: "we should continue to seek full
national treatment of U.S. investment abroad, and we must insist on prompt, adequate, and effective compensation in the few cases of nationalization." Speech by
Secretary of State Kissinger, American Bar Association Annual Convention, in
Montreal, Canada (August 11, 1975), cited in ExpropriatedProperty, supra note 58,
at 258 n.22.
114. H. STEINER & D. VACTS, supra note 49, at 408.
115. Amador, (Fourth) Report on State Responsibility, [1959] 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 1, 21, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/119 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Amador].
116. Id. at 21.
117. Dawson & Weston, supra note 87, at 750.
118. Amador, supra note 115, at 23.
119. Li Hao-p'ei, Nationalization and International Law, reprinted in J.
COHEN & H. Cmu, supra note 15, at 718 [hereinafter cited as Li Hao-p'ei]. Under
the orthodox compensation theory the distinction between the two types of expropriation has no juridical effect so far as the amount, time, and manner of compensation
are concerned, since the fundamental principles involved are considered to be the
same. Amador, supra note 115, at 23.
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particular emphasis on "adequate" compensation being the "full
value of the property at the time of taking plus interest to the date
20
of payment."
A second theory, exactly opposite to the first, asserts that in
cases of nationalization involving a change in a country's socioeconomic structure, the question of compensation is a matter entirely within the discretion of the nationalizing state.' 2 ' That state
has only the obligation not to discriminate against foreigners; if it
does not compensate nationals who are owners, it has no obligation
22
to compensate owners of foreign nationality. 1
The third approach, one which is endorsed by the majority of
commentators, 1 2 3 maintains that the nationalizing state is obligated
to make partial compensation to owners of foreign nationality, the
24
amount depending upon a number of circumstances. 1
None of the claims settlement agreements concluded since the
end of World War I have compensated claimants for the full value
of property taken. 125 More specifically, despite the stated American preference for the orthodox or full compensation standard, no
United States negotiated claims agreement has achieved complete
compensation. 126 Indeed, recent opinion and practice suggest that
global agreements in general, far from envisaging full compensation, consistently provide for partial indemnification, the amount of
which varies considerably depending upon the case and circumstances.1 2 7 It would appear then, that the third or partial compensation theory accurately reflects customary international practice in
extensive expropriation cases and is most consonant with the system of lump-sum agreements.
Applying this flexible, partial compensation approach within
the context of previous claims settlement agreements negotiated by
the United States, the United States-People's Republic of China
Claims-Assets Agreement compares quite favorably. Because the
settlement is in the form of direct cash payments as opposed to the
assignment approach contemplated by the 1973 agreement in principle, all of the $80.5 million will be available to compensate
120.
STATES §
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

193(1) (emphasis added); see note 111 supra.
Amador, supra note 115, at 23.
Li Hao-p'ei, supra note 119, at 721.
Amador, supra note 115, at 23.
Li Hao-p'ei, supra note 119, at 720-21.
Dawson & Weston, supra note 87, at 740.
See id.
Amador, supra note 115, at 22.
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Americans for their claims. The resulting compensation rate of 41
cents on the dollar is in keeping with the average obtained under
preceding agreements, 28 and exceeds what United States officials
determined was required as a minimum. 129 The fact that all payments are to be completed within five years is advantageous to
American claimants when compared with previous settlements
which at times have involved payments spread over twenty
years. 130 It is also significant that neither the United States Government nor the American claimants will face the burden of years
of complex litigation or the resulting risk of diminished compensation. 131 American claimants are assured a recovery of almost 41
cents on the dollar regardless of how much the PRC is able to recover from the blocked assets.
The Agreement is also noteworthy for its impact on overall
Sino-American relations. Resolution of the blocked assets-claims issue has been considered a major step in the United States-People's
Republic of China normalization process 132 as well as a necessary
antecedent to further steps that would promote the policies of both
countries.1 33 Indeed, the claims agreement was followed quickly by
seven other Sino-American accords on scientific, technological, and
business affairs. 134 The most important of these is the United
States-People's Republic of China Agreement on Trade which is
currently awaiting Congressional approval. 135 When approved, the
128. Business America, July 16, 1979, at 7, col. 1.
129. The United States negotiating delegation considered 40 cents on the dollar to be the absolute minimum that would be accepted in settlement. Id. at 8, col. 3;
N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1979, § A at 5, col. 1.
130. Transcript of the Remarks of Hon. W. Michael Blumenthal, Secretary of
the Treasury before the Washington Press Club, reported in Dep't of Treasury News
1 (Mar. 15, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Press Club Remarks].
131. Id.
132. Press Club Remarks, supra note 130, at 1; U.S. Dep't of Commerce News
1 (May 11, 1979).
133. See notes 134, 137, 140, infra.
134. The six accords consisted of four agreements in the fields of meteorology,
oceanography, standards and measurements, and management of science and technology, N.Y, Times, May 14, 1979, § D, at 7, col. 1; a trade exhibition pact, U.S.
Dep't of Commerce News 1 (May 10, 1979); and an agreement to open formal negotiations for an aviation accord to establish direct air links between the United States
and China, U.S. Dep't of Commerce News 1 (May 9, 1979).
135. Wall St. J., May 14, 1979, at 11, col. 2. The United States-People's Republic of China Agreement on Trade was initialled ad referendum on May 14, 1979, U.S.
Dep't of Commerce News 1 (May 14, 1979), and formally signed on July 7, 1979.
N.Y. Times, July 8, 1979, § A, at 1, col. 1. It was submitted by President Carter to
Congress for consideration and approval on October 23, 1979. N.Y. Times, Oct. 24,
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trade agreement will provide a positive framework for expansion of
trade in goods and services between the United States and
China. 136 A claims-assets settlement was a clear prerequisite 13 7 to
conclusion of a trade pact for, without it, Chinese aircraft, ships, or
other property entering the United States would be subject to at38
tachment to satisfy outstanding private American claims.1
Also, of considerable importance to the Chinese is the award
of Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) tariff status. 13 9 United States officials have stated that even the discussion of granting MFN treatment to China must be preceded by a claims settlement.' 4 0 Absence of the non-discriminatory tariff treatment has been the most
significant restriction on United States imports from China,' 4 ' re-

sulting in customs duties on Chinese goods that are generally the
highest applicable under United States law. 14 2 Now that the
claims-assets issue has been resolved, the trade agreement, when
approved, will provide both the United States and China, on a re43
ciprocal basis, non-discriminatory tariff treatment.1
A claims settlement agreement is also considered a prerequisite to extension of United States Export-Import Bank credits to
help China finance United States imports. 14 4 PRC eligibility for
Eximbank credits is considered a separate issue from the granting
1979, § A, at 1, col. 4. Congress has sixty days in which to vote on the agreement.
Pub. L. No. 93-618, Title I, ch. 5, § 151(e)(1), 88 Stat. 1978, 2002-03 (1975).
136. The agreement provides Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) status for China, reciprocal tariff treatment for the United States, physical facilities to help businessmen
do business in China, protection for United States patents, trademarks, and copyrights, and procedures for settling trade disputes. U.S. Dep't of Commerce News 1
(May 14, 1979). The agreement will last for three years but is renewable for additional three year periods. Wall St. J., May 14, 1979, at 11, col. 2.
137. N.Y. Times, May 13, 1979, § A, at 1, col. 1; Wall St. J., May 12, 1979 at 8,
col. 2.
138. N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1979, § A, at 5, col. 1; Expropriated Property, supra
note 58, at 254.
139. Press Club Remarks, supra note 130, at 2.
140. Hearings on H.R. 10170 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 2, 519 (1974) (written statement by Secretary of State Kissinger).
141. Denny & Stein, Recent Developments in Trade Between the U.S. and the
PRC: A Legal and Economic Perspective, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 260, 263
(1973).
142. Lubman, supra note 18, at 53.
143. U.S. Dep't of CQmmerce News 1 (May 14, 1979). The extension of MFN
trading status to China is expected to cut import tariffs on Chinese goods by amounts
varying from 10 to 60 percent. N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 1979, § A, at 3, col. 3.
144. N.Y. Times, April 20, 1979, § A, at 9, col. 1; Wall St. J., Mar 5, 1979, at 8,
col. 2.
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of MFN treatment.145 However, once the bilateral trade pact is approved and MFN status is in effect, the United States is prepared
46
to grant China such official financing.1
Thus, the claims-assets agreement is a precondition to a number of steps in the Sino-American normalization process and paves
the way for the development of a mutually beneficial economic relationship in the years ahead.
CONCLUSION
The United States-People's Republic of China Claims-Assets
Agreement represents a resolution of two conflicting United States
interests, that of American claimants to secure the best rate of
compensation on their long-standing claims, and that of the United
States Government and the American people to, as quickly and expeditiously as possible, remove a significant obstacle to the complete normalization of Sino-American relations. As a final settlement of American claims, the United States-People's Republic of
China agreement compares favorably with previous agreements settling similar claims. Perhaps more importantly, it facilitates, after a
lapse of more than a quarter of a century, renewed communication
and exchange with a nation comprising a fourth of the population of
the world.
Charlene M. Levie
145. Wall St. J., Mar. 2, 1979, at 8, col. 3.
146. Id. Vice President Mondale has stated:
The United States is prepared to establish Export-Import Bank Credit
arrangements for the People's Republic of China on a case by case basis, up
to a total of $2 billion over a five-year period. If the pace of development
warrants it, we are prepared to consider additional credit arrangements.
N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 1979, § A, at 3, col. 2.

